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The purpose of this paper is to apply Dean’s (2001) model of the ‘Asian governance triangle’ 
to assess the symbiosis relationships among the Chinese government finance, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the banking system in China. According to Dean, the relationship as a 
whole is fragile and unhealthy. This is because crises of such character are interdependent and 
contagious in that crisis in any one corner could readily lead to crises in the others. However, 
China has so far managed to avoid a financial crisis, which according to Dean (2001), is due 
to three reasons. Firstly, China remains willing to pour public funds into its SOEs and banks. 
Partly, as a result, hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese people keep adding to their bank 
deposits, which enable the banks to sustain their flow of non-repayable loans to the SOEs. 
Secondly, China remains shielded from the crisis by its holding of massive foreign exchange 
reserves. Finally, the financial system is well protected by its exchange and capital controls. 
However, over the years, a series of reforms of its SOEs and banking system has severed the 
symbiosis relationships through the introduction of banking and corporate governance in the 
system. Any disruption of the gradual approach towards the reforms by hastily adopting a 
flexible exchange rate and free capital flows would do more harm than 
benefit China in the long run. 
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   1
China’s “Triangle of Woes“ and Its Impact on Financial Stability 
 
 
The adoption of open door policy since 1978 has been followed by a series of 
economic reforms for the last two decades or so. However, the financial sector, in 
particular the banking system is still the weakest part of the economic structure of the 
Chinese economy. Equally weak is the state-owned enterprises, which have 
undergone several drastic changes over the years are still making losses, albeit with 
slight improvement in recent years. Government finances, on the other hand still 
needs a major revamp before a healthy balance sheet can be presented. The three 
entities which represent the three core pillars of the Chinese economy are somehow 
intertwined such that any changes in one entity will have significant repercussion on 
the other. The symbiotic relationship among these three entities has been called by 
Dean (2001) as the “Asian Governance Triangle” or “Triangle of Woes.” 
 
The fragile financial structure emerging in China at any time may contribute to 
financial instabilities, which under certain circumstances might bring about a financial 
collapse. In particular, the big state-owned Chinese banks have been on the verge of 
bankruptcy and previously technically insolvent, only supported by the Chinese 
government working as a tacit guarantor for the banks and people’s continued 
confidence in these banks. Furthermore, the banking problem has become more acute 
basically due to massive lending to the faltering state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which has been the contributing factor in a huge build-up of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and subsequent financial problems for the banks. In addition, the Chinese 
government official budget deficits combined with hidden liabilities, such as 
unfunded pensions, have caused more concerns on the overall stability of the Chinese 
economy.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to apply Dean’s (2001) model of the ‘Asian governance 
triangle’ to assess the symbiosis relationships among the Chinese government finance, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the banking system in China. After the 
Introduction, the second section explains the “Asian governance triangle” and its 
symbiotic relationships. This is followed the next section by examining each 
constituent of the triangle. The fourth section attempts to extend the Dean’s model to 
reflect the evolutionary changes of the governance structure. The last section alerts   2
that any disruption of the gradual approach towards the reforms by hastily adopting a 
flexible exchange rate and free capital flows would do more harm than benefit China 
in the long run. 
 
2.  The “Asian Governance Triangle” and Its Symbiotic Relationships 
Dean (2001) has delineated certain characteristics of what he refers to as “Asian 
Governance Triangle” (AGT) involving a three-way symbiosis between government, 
finance and industry. Figure 1.1 depicts the government’s fiscal deficit (D), at the top 
of the triangle. This feeds in to the banks (B), at the bottom right corner and then to 
the SOEs (S) at the bottom left. This is, as dubbed by Dean, China’s ‘triangle of woes’. 
He stresses that each corner of the triangle is vulnerable to a crisis on its own account. 
For instance, a crisis at corner D could erupt if the government would not be able to 
finance its deficit by selling bonds or printing money. A crisis at corner B could also 
happen if people lost confidence in the banks and started withdrawing deposits (or if 
deposits stopped growing), and finally a possible crisis at the SOE (S) corner can be 
provoked by overwhelming losses.  
 







D: Government budget deficit 
B: Banks 
S: State-owned enterprises 
Adapted from Dean (2001) 
 
Dean emphasizes that crises arising from the AGT are interdependent and contagious. 
Crisis in any one corner could therefore readily lead to crises in the others. A crisis at 
D could result in the termination of the government bond interest paid to banks, 
government subsidies to SOEs, or to both. Were banks cut off from government bond 
D 
B  S   3
income, they would likely find themselves unable to retain deposits. The crisis would 
have spread from D to B. Or if subsidies to SOEs ceased, the banks would likely find 
themselves hard-put to earn loan revenues, and again the fiscal crisis would spread to 
B. Similarly, crises at the B or S corners might spread to the D corner; if banks or 
SOEs were the initial source of crisis, the resulting rise in subsidy spending might so 
bloat the government deficit as to cause a crisis there too (Dean, 2001). 
 
In China, Dean argues, this internal fragility (SOEs, banks and fiscal deficit) is 
obvious. Experiences in other countries in the last decade have show that internal 
fragility causes financial crises. For instance, Latin America’s international debt crisis 
in 1982-89 had much to do with fiscal deficits (Bowe and Dean, 1997; Dean, 1998); 
Mexico’s crisis of 1994-95 had much to do with bad banking; and East Asia’s crisis 
of 1997-98 had much to do with an unhealthy symbiosis between bad banking and 
loss-making enterprises with weak corporate governance. But in each of these cases, 
internal fragility led to a crisis on the countries’ external capital accounts, a crisis that 
manifested itself most dramatically as a collapse in their currencies’ external values. 
Hence, the internal problems became a full-blown crisis with catastrophic real 
consequences only after they turned into external problems.  
 
However, China has so far managed to avoid a financial crisis, which according to 
Dean (2001), is due to three reasons. Firstly, China remains willing to pour public 
funds into the SOEs and the banks. Partly, as a result, hundreds of millions of 
ordinary Chinese people keep adding to their bank deposits, deposits that enable the 
banks to sustain their flow of non-repayable loans to the SOEs. Basically, most 
Chinese people have no where else to hold their savings, except as cash. Secondly, 
China remains shielded from crisis by the structure of its external balance sheet. 
China has massive foreign exchange reserves and relatively long-term foreign 
liabilities. The proportion of short-term debt is low enough for it to be easily repaid 
out of foreign exchange reserves should external creditors decide not to roll it over. 
Thirdly, China remains shielded by capital controls. This is an effective tool in 
preventing massive ‘capital flight’ usually with an ensuing currency crisis.  
 
2.1  The AGT and its Symbiotic Relationships   4
In the pre-reform period, the allocation of funds to the SOEs was almost exclusively 
handled by the state plans. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) acted only as an 
auxiliary in providing supplementary working capital to SOEs. In a bid to improve the 
efficiency of capital utilization, reforms were introduced to achieve a clear division of 
labor between the budget and the banks in investments financing (Qian, 1994). While 
policy-oriented items would continue to be covered by government funding, other 
capital requirements, including those of SOEs, would be channeled through the 
banking sector on commercial terms. This stemmed from the ‘loan for grant’ reform 
of 1983-84, in which the SOEs would rely heavily on bank loans for capital inputs; 
subsequently 90% of enterprise borrowings were from the state banks (Li, 1998). 
According to Lardy (1998:83), at the end of 1995 exposure to SOEs was high as 83% 
of all loans from the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), and 90% of all lending 
for fixed investments by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) were 
to SOEs.  This shows a marked shift in capital allocation for the SOEs, given that in 
1978, only 24% of the total provision of funds (for both fixed assets and working 
capital) was supplied through the state banking sector (Huang and Yang, 1998).  
 
The SOEs’ performance worsened rapidly during the 1990s. In 1996, about half of the 
SOEs lost money, and the state sector as a whole made a net loss of RMB 38 billion 
(Huang and Yang, 1998). The debt-equity ratio of the SOEs rose dramatically from 
23% in 1980 to 440% in 1998, following the ‘loan for grant’ reform (Bartel & Huang, 
2000). Rapid accumulation of enterprise debts is not a problem in itself, but it may 
lead to significant financial distress if net earnings do not cover the increasingly larger 
interest payments. The enterprise reforms succeeded in expanding autonomy and 
providing incentives but failed to establish a governance system for monitoring and 
enforcing responsibility. State-ownership was maintained, loss-making SOEs were 
rarely liquidated and redundant workers were usually not dismissed.   
 
As a consequence of inefficiency, SOEs’ financial performance has deteriorated 
during the reform period (see Table1). Their liability to assets ratios have grown and 
return on assets declined, while their losses have increased. Government subsidies 
peaked in 1989, but since then the government has been unable to cover SOE losses   5
due to a weak fiscal position, and increasingly the banking system and involuntary 
enterprise credits (triangular debt)
1 have made good the shortfall (Perkins, 1999).  
 
Table 1 - Financial Performance of SOEs and Government Subsidies 
Year 





Ratio of liabilities to 
assets of SOEs 











     
1986 5.5  0.187*  19.9  32.5 
1987 6.1  na  19.7  37.6 
1988 8.2  na  20.2  44.6 
1989  18.0 na  17.5 59.9 
1990  34.9 na  12.9 57.9 
1991  36.7 na  12.3 51.0 
1992  36.9 na  12.4 44.5 
1993  45.3 0.646  12.9 41.1 
1994  48.3 0.652  12.5 36.6 
1995  54.1 0.622  09.3 32.8 
Note: na means not available 
* from 1980 data. 
Sources: (1) State Statistical Bureau, 1996b and previous years, China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Publishing House, 
Beijing; (2) State Statistical Bureau, 1996a and previous years, Yearbook of China’s Public Finance, China Statistical Publishing 
House, Beijing 
Adapted from Perkins (1999) 
 
The financial deficits of the SOEs had direct fiscal implications. The revenue capacity 
of the fiscal system declined significantly during the reform period. The share of 
fiscal revenues to GDP decreased from above 30% in the early 1980s to 12% in the 
late 1990s (Bartel and Huang, 2000). This was partly an expected outcome due to the 
‘tax for profit’ reform by which the government no longer directly collected enterprise 
profits and partly an unexpected consequence of the government’s inability to enforce 
tax collection upon the newly growing non-state sectors. However, the government 
could not refrain completely from intervening in enterprise activities, especially from 
subsidizing loss-making SOEs. In doing so, the government sought financial 
resources from the commercial banks in the form of policy loans, which accounted for 
about 35-40% of total bank loans in the 1990s (see Table 2).  
                                                 
1 The problem occurs because one state enterprise (a manufacturer) owes a second state enterprise (a 
supplier). The second state enterprise owes money to a third state enterprise (a bank). In this example 
the second enterprise cannot pay its debt to the third enterprise because it cannot collect from the first 
enterprise. The first enterprise cannot earn money because it makes goods that no one wants. Since all 
enterprises are owned by the same entity, the state, it appears that the state owes money to itself. The 
problem is that the inefficient first enterprise continues to function despite the fact that it is inefficiently 
using resources. 
 
   6
 
Table 2 - Policy Loans in China 1991-1996 (RMB 100 million) 
Policy loans  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Investment in fixed assets  1,906.5  1,959.0 2,735.9  3,896.0 5,382.1 6,631.2 
Purchase of agricultural products  1,874.2 1,857.4  2,272.1  3,144.5 3,589.7 3,695.6 
Purchase of products for export  1,791.5 2,145.8  2,594.4  2,890.6 3,266.3 3,745.5 
State bank agricultural loans  1,209.5  1,448.7 1,720.2  1,554.1 1,921.6 2,367.8 
Policy  loans  total  6,781.7  7,410.9  9,322.6 11,485.2 14,159.7 16,440.1 
Total loans by state banks  18,044.1  21,615.5  26,461.1  32,441.3  39,393.6  47,434.7 
Proportion of policy loans (%)   37.6 34.3  35.2  35.4  35.9  34.7 
Source: Institute of Economics (1998) 
Adapted from Huang & Yang (1998) 
 
The official fiscal deficit was around 1% of GDP, which is healthy and sustainable by 
international experience. However, if the policy loans were regarded as implicit 
budget expenditures in the 1990s, the implied fiscal deficits would be as high as 25% 
of the GDP (see Table 3). In addition, projects financed by policy loans usually have 
high default rates (Bartel and Huang, 2000).  
 


















1985 200.5  22.4  200.4  0.0  185.8  -20.7 
1990 293.7  15.8  308.4  -0.8  545.9  -29.5 
1991 314.9  14.6  338.7  -1.1  678.2  -31.4 
1992 348.3  13.1  374.2  -1.0  741.1  -27.9 
1993 434.9  12.6  464.2  -0.8  932.3  -26.9 
1994 521.8  11.2  579.3  -1.2  1148.5 -24.6 
1995 624.2  10.7  682.4  -1.0  1416.0 -24.2 
1996 740.8  10.8  793.8  -0.8  1644.0 -24.0 
1997 865.1  11.6  923.4  -0.8  1986.2 -26.6 
1998 985.3  12.4  1077.1  -1.2  na  na 
Notes: the last column gives the total implied deficits including both official fiscal deficits and policy loans. Na. represents data 
not available 
Sources: SSB (various years) 
Adapted from Bartel and Huang (2000). 
 
To safeguard social stability, the government did not want to see inefficient SOEs 
closed. The state banks became the victims of this behaviour. The banks, therefore, 
not only failed to recover old loans but were also forced to extend new ones. This 
created a moral hazard problem and further weakened the state banking sector (Huang 
and Yang, 1998).  
 
The objective of the state-owned bank reform was to build a well functioning two-tier 
bank system with the central bank responsible for financial supervision and monetary   7
policy, and the commercial banks responsible for the allocation of capital. In 1983, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) officially became the central bank. A large state 
banking system was gradually built on four pillar SOCBs, namely the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the 
Bank of China (BoC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB). These four major 
banks accounted for about 70% of domestic credit and held over 70% of household 
deposits (Lardy, 1998). However, the intention of the reform policies was to establish 
a truly independent central bank and purely commercial state-owned banks, but this 
turned out to be a long process which has not yet completed. Furthermore, since the 
local governments appointed the managers of the SOCBs, bank lending decisions 
could hardly avoid administrative intervention. Finally, as a result of the banks 
lending to the SOEs there has been a significant accumulation of NPLs in China’s 
financial system (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 - Reported NPLs in Chinese Financial System 2003-2004 
  as of  USD billion  NPL ratio (% of total 
loans) 
% of GDP 
(1) 
State-owned Commercial Banks  Dec-03  232  20  17 
Joint Stock Commercial Banks  Mar-04  23  7  2 
Policy Banks  Jun-03  19  18  1 
Credit cooperatives  Mar-04  60  30  4 
Banking system total  Dec-03 373  19  28 
Asset management companies  Dec-03  107  -  8 
Financial system total  Mar-04 480  -  36 
Sources: Garcia-Herrero et al (2005) estimations based on official figures reported by Bofit (2004), Ernst & Young (2004), Ping 
(2003), and Pei Shirai (2004). 
(1) June 2003 annual GDP  
Adapted from Garcia-Herrero et al (2005) 
 
Initially the government supported the SOEs; however this task was transferred to the 
banks after the ‘loan for grant’ reform of 1983-84. This paved the way for massive 
lending to the SOEs, which caused a deteriorating financial situation for the banks, 
especially during the 1990s. The government also continued to a certain extent its 
subsidies to the SOEs. The major input for funds for the banks was the Chinese 
people’s deposits which ensured a flow of liquidity, given the continued confidence 
by the people in the banks. However, the system rested on shaky financial 
fundamentals due to the problem of the intertwined banks (growing NPLs) and 
government (guarantor of deposits, but worsening fiscal situation) and SOEs   8
(bleeding money due to inefficiency, and social and political considerations) which 
significantly exposed the structure to a systemic collapse if one of the entities fell. 
3.  The AGT’s Constituents and Their Reforms 
3.1 The ‘B’ of the Triangle - Chinese Banks 
Since the opening up of the economy it has been the banks that have been almost 
wholly responsible for channelling the Chinese people’s deposits achieved by very 
high savings rate into investments. And due to China’s failure to develop healthy 
stock and bond markets, bank assets have grown to almost RMB 30 trillion in 2004, 
or 210% of GDP. In fact, this is the highest of any big economy, and to compare with 
other economies; India is at 170%, Brazil 160% and Mexico 100% (The Economist, 
2005). However, the banks have managed these huge deposits from the Chinese 
people rather poorly; lending on government instructions to unprofitable projects and 
struggling SOEs has contributed to huge NPLs (Lardy, 1998). This practice has come 
to pose a threat to the whole of China’s financial system. In addition, the investments 
made from the loans have been very unproductive. Already, China needs almost USD 
5 of fresh capital to generate USD 1 of incremental output. This is a far worse ratio 
than Western countries and even India.  
 
The health of the Chinese banking system has come under a spotlight since the 
beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In early 1998, the PBoC estimated the 
average proportion of the NPLs stood at 24% in the four SOCBs. This was much 
bigger than those NPL ratios of pre-crisis Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia (Huang and Yang, 1998). But China maintained strong GDP growth in the 
following years without major financial instability. Furthermore, China's entry into 
the WTO in 2001 revived the anxieties about the sustainability of its banking system. 
China promised to grant, within 5 years after joining the WTO, foreign banks market 
access and to remove geographic and client restrictions. The WTO agreements 
became effective on February 1, 2002. Therefore, a better banking sector is needed in 
China mainly due to two reasons: firstly, overcome the macroeconomic threat posed 
by fragile and poorly run SOCBs. Secondly, improve the efficiency with which 
capital is allocated and utilized.    9
3.12 Banking Reforms 
There are four steps in the institutional reform of the Chinese banking system. The 
first step was undertaken in 1984 when the mono-bank system was replaced with a 
multi-tiered one, in which central banking functions were separated from the rest. 
Four SOCBs were established. In 1994 the second step involved the creation of policy 
lending banks to take over from SOCBs projects for development purposes, thus 
separating commercial banking activities from those specially directed towards social 
and economic development. In 1995 a new Commercial Banking Law was also 
approved to regulate commercial banks. The third step was the strengthening of the 
institutional design of PBoC, with three main responsibilities: monetary stability, 
banking supervision, and the oversight of the payments system. The fourth step was 
the creation of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003, which 
separated the responsibilities for monetary policy and banking supervision (Garcia-
Herrero
  et al, 2005). Apart from the institutional development of the Chinese banking 
system, the banking reform has been based upon three main pillars: bank restructuring, 




The most pressing problems for Chinese banks have been poor asset quality and very 
low capitalization. As a result, the clean up of NPLs and recapitalization have been 
regarded as the most important areas of bank restructuring. This has led to the 
government injecting capital into the banks to reduce the NPL ratio. The first capital 
injection to the four SOCBs occurred in 1998 of the equivalent value of USD 33 
billion. This was succeeded in 1999-2000 by the transfer of NPLs (at book value) of 
equivalent of USD 170 billion from the four SOCBs to the four newly created Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs). 
 
AMCs were established in 1999 with the objective to improve state-owned banks’ 
NPL ratio. Their task is mainly to collect NPLs, restructure them or convert them into 
equity. They issue bonds and borrowing from financial institutions to pay for the 
NPLs they receive. They are also in charge of restructuring SOEs and recommending 
companies for listing. By end-2005, the AMCs resolved 67% of assumed assets, 
almost six years after the start of the process, with a 21% cash recovery ratio   10
(Podpiera, 2006). However, the loans were bought at 50% of face value which implies 
that in practice that there has only been a 10.5% cash recovery rate of the nominal 
value (see Table 5)
2. This is quite off target with regard to the early projections of a 
30-50% cash recovery rate. There are also suspicions that corruption and 
embezzlements have taken place within the AMCs, and that loans have been sold off 
very cheaply to friends and family of local AMC officials, and thus further decreasing 
the cash recovery rate (Tay, 2005). There has also been some fear the AMCs might 
actually increase NPLs as the parent banks view the AMCs as convenient outlets for 
future transfer of NPLs. In addition, the National Audit Office of the PRC reported 
that close to RMB 47 billion in spending by the AMCs has been used improperly. 191 
officials have either been dismissed, demoted, received warnings or fined (Lianhe 
Zaobao, 2006). Anyhow, the government has set the end of 2006 as the deadline for 
the AMCs to work out all the NPLs. 
 





Share of banks 
loans 
Outstanding 









Orient Asset Management   BoC  32.3  20.4  12.9  39.9  2.9  22.8 
Great Wall Asset Management  ABC  41.8  24.6  25.8  61.8  2.7  10.4 
Cinda Asset Management  CCB  45.0  21.7  18.56  41.2  6.2  33.6 
Huarong Asset Management  ICBC  49.2  17.9  25.9  52.6  5.1  19.9 
Total    168.3 20.7  83.2  49.4  16.9  20.6 
Note: in USD billions at March-2005 
Source: PBoC, CRBC, Annual reports, BIS working paper No. 115 
Adapted from Garcia-Herrero
 et al, 2005 
 
The second capital injection took place in December 2003 with USD 22.5 billion 
injected into the best performing SOCBs; CCB and BoC. These injections came from 
China’s official international reserves, through the transfer of rights of ownership of 
US government bonds. Due to certain restrictions, these could not be converted into 
RMB. Hence, the banks’ existing capital was used to write-off USD 23.4 billion of 
NPLs. This operation led to a very marginal increase in capitalization; however the 
asset quality improved substantially. Furthermore, in June 2004 the equivalent of 
USD 15.6 billion and 18.1 billion in NPLs were auctioned from CCB and BoC, 
respectively, to AMCs at 50% of face value.  
 
                                                 
2 From March 2005   11
The third capital injection took place in April 2005, with USD 15 billion injected into 
ICBC. These funds were also taken from the official international reserves, and not 
converted into RMB. The restructuring continued in June 2005 with approval of an 
NPL disposal of USD 85.5 billion to AMCs and the issuance of USD 12.1 billion in 
subordinated debt. All in all, the Chinese government has injected more than USD 
260 billion into to its banks via straight handouts and by allowing the SOCBs to 
remove NPLs to the AMCs. To put it in perspective; this is about twice what South 
Korea spent to restructure its banks after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and about 
what America needs to bail out its savings and loans industry (The Economist, 2005). 
 
The alarming high NPL ratio in China has been of great concern for the stability of 
the banking system. In total, an estimated of 20-24% of the 2004 GDP has been 
injected into the banking system as capital as a substitute of NPLs, amounting to over 
110% of the SOCBs’ capital in injections. Recent figures suggest that although the 
NPL ratio has decreased, this seems likely to be due to the growth of new loans (see 
Table 6). This is potentially a worrying trend, given Chinese banks’ poor risk 
management and inadequate corporate governance practices. Nevertheless, the 
dismantling of the NPLs still remains one of the most pressing issues in order to 
secure better financial stability in China. However, there have been a lot uncertainties 
pertaining to the true extent of the NPLs, and there has often been a considerable 
discrepancy of estimates between unofficial estimates and the CBRC’s official figures 
(Newsweek, 2005).  
 
 Table 6 – NPLs of The Big Four Chinese Banks 2002-2005 
 
                 2002  2003  2004  1Q2005 2Q2005 3Q2005  4Q2005
Asset share in the 
Chinese  banking 
system 
60.1% 58.0% 53.6% -  53.6%  -  - 
Average NPL 
ratio 
26.2%  20.4% 15.6% 15%  10.1% 10.1% 10.4% 
Note: end of period. The big four banks are China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BoC), 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)  
Sources: China Banking Regulatory Commission; Moody’s Investors Service (2005) 
Partially adapted from Ma (2006) 
 
It is still too early to pass a judgment on the bank restructuring, however it seems that 
banks are subject to contradictory dictates from the authorities. For example the 
CBRC has threatened to fire bank managers if nonperforming loans in their portfolios   12
rise by 2% in a given year. Yet those seen as refusing loans to small and medium-size 
enterprises (a high-risk category of borrowers) face the wrath of the Central Bank 
(Newsweek, 2005). 
 
Reduction of government intervention 
In 1999 government interference in lending became illegal, at least in formal terms. 
Furthermore, interest rate liberalization has been regarded as important for Chinese 
banks to enhance the role of market forces in resource allocation. The approach 
towards the interest rate liberalization has been gradual, and is not yet completed. 
 
Opening up to foreign competition 
China has, under WTO’s rule, pledged to fully open the Chinese banking system to 
foreign affiliates by the end of 2006. By then, foreign banks will be able to offer all 
banking services in local currency in all provinces and even to Chinese households. 
Previously, the foreign banks’ operations in China have been limited to wholesale 
business and in few other areas. This sequencing in terms of entry of foreign banks 
adopted by the Chinese government has been able to avoid some of the problems 
observed in other countries, where a rapid entry of foreign banks has been associated 
with excessively rapid growth in overall bank lending fuelling speculative excesses 
(Ferri, 2005).  
 
One of the main strategies in banking reform is to attract foreign strategic investors to 
buy minority stakes (see Table 7). There has been great interest among investors to 
get a piece of the Chinese banking industry. CCB had a successful listing on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange in October 2005, and BoC is set to be listed later in 2006. This 
fits well in to what appears to be the Chinese government’s strategy of retaining 
control of the SOCBs through the majority of shares, yet list part of the shares on the 
stock exchange. An IPO (initial pubic offering) should, in addition to providing 
additional capital, increase the transparency of bank operations, enhance the standards 
of reporting, and increase the attention paid to bank operations. However, the role of 
strategic investors in domestic banks has been limited so far, as ownership regulations 
limit the share of a single foreign owner to 20%. However, this is consistent with the 
Chinese authorities’ stated object to help develop and strengthen management systems 
in the local banks without allowing foreign control of major Chinese banks. On the   13
other hand, low ownership shares of foreign strategic investors in Chinese banks and 
their limited management involvement could weaken the incentives for foreign 
investors to take an active interest in the overall bank performance and make them 
focus on creating value only in narrow areas of cooperation (e.g. issuing credit cards) 
(Podpiera, 2006).  
 
Table 7 - Announced Foreign Direct Investments in Chinese Banks 
Year Target  Banks  Strategic  Investor  Equity Investment
2006  Ningbo City Commercial Bank   OCBC  USD 70.6 m (12.2%) 
2005  ICBC  Goldman Sachs-led consortium  USD 3,600 m (10%) 
2005  Tianjin City Commercial Bank  Australia and New Zealand Bank  USD 110 m (20%) 
2005  BoC  RBS/Temasek/UBS/ADB  USD 5,220 m (16.84%) 
2005  CCB  BoA/Temasek  USD 3,966 m (14.1%) 
2005  Bank of Communication  HSBC  USD 1,750 m (19.9% 
2005  Bohai Bank  Standard Chartered Bank  USD 123 m (19.9%) 
2005  Huaxia Joint Stock Bank  Deutsche Bank/Pangaea  USD 454 m (20.9% 
2005  Hangzhou City Bank  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  USD 78 m (19.9%) 
2005  Bank of Beijing  ING/IFC  USD 270 m (24.9% 
2004  Bank of Jinan  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  USD 17 m (11%) 
2004  Xian City Commercial Bank  IFC/Bank of Nova Scotia  USD 6 m (5%) 
2004  Shenzhen Development Bank  Newbridge Capital  USD 150 m (17.9%) 
2004  Minsheng Bank  IFC/Temasek  USD 458 m (6.2%) 
2004  Industrial Bank  Hang Seng Bank/IFC/GIC  USD 326 m (24.9%) 
2002  Shanghai Pudong Development Bank  Citigroup  USD 73 m (5%) 
2002  Nanjing City Commercial Bank  IFC  USD 27 (15%) 
2002  China Everbright Bank  IFC  USD 19 (4.9%) 
2002  Bank of Shanghai  IFC/HSBC/HK Shanghai Com Bank  USD 133 (13%) 
Total      About USD 16.8 billion 
Note: The year is the announcement date of the investment. Some announced deals are still pending regulatory approval. The 
sizes of investments in Bank of Communications and CCB are those before the latter’s recent IPOs. The Bohai Bank is a new 
bank with Standard Chartered as one of its founding shareholders.  
Sources: Caijing Magazine, No. 123 (2004) and No. 136 (2005); The Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 June 2005 and 27 January 
2006; The 21
st Century Economic Report, 24 August 2005; The Financial News, 7 and 9 September 2005.  
Adapted from Ma (2006) 
 
Regulation and supervision 
The liberalization and restructuring measures have been accompanied by 
improvements in regulation, and especially with the establishment of the CBRC in 
2003. The CBRC has enhanced transparency through reporting of individual bank 
data, including the NPLs. However, it is worth mentioning that foreign companies 
like Ernst & Young and S&P usually have had much higher estimates of NPLs than 
the official data (Newsweek, 2005). Other improvements from the CBRC have been 
the enhancement of the five-tier loan classification system
3 which the banks had to 
comply with at the end of 2005. Secondly, capital adequacy ratio requirements have 
                                                 
3 The five-category loan classification means that commercial banks classify loans into five categories 
according to different degree of risk. The five categories are respectively Pass, Special Mention, 
Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss. This system is prevalent in America, Canada, Europe, and Southeast 
Asia as methods of classifying loans and controlling risks.  
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been introduced in compliance with Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision. These ratios will need to be fully complied with by banks in 2007. 
 
3.2  The ‘S’ of triangle - Chinese State-owned Enterprises 
At the beginning of China’s reform period, almost 80% of the gross value of Chinese 
industrial output was produced by SOEs, and these firms dominated the urban 
economy. SOEs employed almost 80% of workers in the cities, and consumed most of 
the national savings in their capital investments. Although they were big, these 
enterprises were also clearly inefficient, and efforts to reform them began with Zhao 
Ziyang’s experiments in Sichuan Province, even before the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) in December 
1978 (Parker, 2002). Since then, SOE reform has been foremost in the policies of 
economic reform, and yet the problem of these enterprises continues to be intractable. 
Deng Xiaoping said that the SOEs were to be the cornerstone of China’s “socialist 
market economy.” However, according to Huang (2001), profits of SOEs declined 
significantly, especially after 1989. Once the cash cow of the central government, 
most SOEs were losing money by the mid-1990s, and absorbing large government 
subsidies as well as staggering amounts of loans that would never be repaid.  
 
3.2.1 SOE reform – Corporate governance and Transformation 
The SOE reform started out with the belief that the problems of the SOEs (poor 
performance, low profitability, and inferior competitiveness) could be solved through 
‘power-delegating’ and ‘profit-sharing’ without changing the basic institutional 
framework of the SOEs. However, this approach saw limited achievements because of 
the unchanged institutional framework of the SOEs (Wu, 2005). Firstly, when the 
government reduced the administrative intervention in the SOEs, the government had 
to delegate more managerial power to the insiders of the enterprises. However, the 
insiders were not the real owners, and due to the system there was unchecked insider 
control with the potential of moral hazard. The only way for the government to 
control this was to strengthen supervision and intervention by government organs. 
Hence, it was back to square one.  
 
Secondly, the lack of modern corporate governance practices (e.g. independent board 
of directors), but instead a ‘factory director responsibility system’ without a clearly   15
defined division of power and responsibility between the factory director and the 
party committee (supervisory body), also led to unchecked insider control and 
corruption.  
 
The Third Plenary Session of the 14
th CCCPC in November 1993 decided that 
deepening SOE reforms should “emphasize on the institutional innovation of 
enterprises”. This marked a shift in SOE reform strategy from ‘power-delegating’ and 
‘profit-sharing’ to institutional innovation of enterprises. The “Company Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)”, 1993 went into effect on 1 July 1994. Then 100 
SOEs were selected for pilot studies in corporatization. However, due to the lack of 
emphasis on using diversification of share ownership to restructure existing SOEs into 
real enterprises, most enterprises involved in the experiment simply converted 
themselves to wholly state-owned companies that were similar to modern 
corporations only in form. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 15
th CCCPC in 1999 
reiterated the requirements for corporatization, and consequently the large and 
medium-sized SOEs entered the period of establishing modern corporations according 
to internationally prevalent norms. Consequently, the corporatization of large and 
medium-sized SOEs after 1998 basically included three successive steps (Wu, 2005): 
 
(1) The transfer of administrative functions of ministry-level institutions (“national 
industry corporations” and “group corporations” that belonged to central government 
and had had both administrative and enterprise functions), to “state bureaus” under 
the State Economic and Trade Commission, thus turning these national industry 
corporations and group operations into enterprises without administrative function. 
 
(2) Previously usually one enterprise was set up in one industry or one sub-industry. 
But after 1998 the state broke up monopolies to promote competition by splitting and 
restructuring those enterprises. An example would be in the petroleum industry, with 
the creation of SINOPEC and CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation). 
 
(3) IPOs on domestic and overseas securities markets after asset restructuring 
Two approaches were employed to convert the SOEs into real enterprises: 
•  Spin off noncore assets by splitting and remove redundant personnel by 
early retirement and recommendation for reemployment, and to restructure   16
the core assets for IPO. This approach proved more effective but took 
longer time. 
•  Carve out core assets from the original enterprise and restructure them for 
IPO, but to leave historical burdens such as noncore assets, nonperforming 
financial claims, and redundant personnel to the original enterprise to 
ensure the success of IPO. This approach took effect more quickly but it 
left more unresolved problems. However, China mainly employed this 
approach.  
 
In addition, the Chinese government used zhuada fangxiao (‘grasp the large and let go 
of the small’  抓  大  放  小) approach to promote large-scale SOEs, which was 
reaffirmed at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPC (Communist Party of China) in 
September 1997. The centerpiece of the zhuada reforms is the promotion of a number 
of large state-owned enterprise groups (企业集团) including 120 groups known as the 
‘national team’. Running parallel with these reforms, in 1997 the government 
announced preferential support for 512 key large and medium enterprises, 74 of 
which were core members of the national team. While these 512 firms accounted for 
just 1% of all SOEs, they were responsible for 55% of assets, 60% of sales and 80% 
of taxes of the state industrial sector (CDBW, 14 January, cited in Sutherland 2001).  
 
To maintain control by the government, corporatization usually left listed companies 
dominated by state-owned shares. The shareholder’s rights of these controlling shares 
were usually exercised by wholly state-owned authorized investment institutions. The 
implications are that firstly, the directors, with the support of the authorized 
investment institution, dominated the board of directors. Furthermore, the chairman of 
a joint stock limited company is the legal representative under the Company Law of 
1993 . Hence, even when the listed companies that achieved diversification of share 
ownership were under the complete control of the state-owned authorized investment 
institution, it would still not have independent as required by a market economy. 
Secondly, using “remaining enterprises”
4 that were formerly under the old system as 
                                                 
4 Restructuring for the SOEs was usually done by “carving out for IPO”, i.e. state holding companies, 
state assets management companies, national industry corporations, and enterprise groups carved out 
their better-performing assets to set up joint stock limited companies for IPO financing. The assets and 
staff not carved out remained in the original enterprises, or authorized investment institutions, 
otherwise known as “remaining enterprises”.   17
authorized investment institutions to control the listed companies was not conducive 
in transforming these companies into private business corporations (Wu, 2005). 
 
The “remaining enterprises” were often stuck with the burden of assets, debts, staff, 
products, and other things not suitable to be carved out for IPO. This meant that many 
of them had the need to constantly obtain resources from their listed subsidiaries in 
order to survive. Moreover, because the “remaining enterprises” were usually the 
controlling shareholders of their listed subsidiaries, they also had the power to 
withdraw resources. Consequently, there were incidents where parent companies 
transferred money from their listed companies causing a ‘hollowing out’ effect. 
Furthermore, some authorized investment institutions stripped an enterprise of the 
high-quality assets, leaving debts with the group operations and then filed for 
bankruptcy. This put even more strain on the banks.  
 
3.2.2 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
In April 2003 SASAC was established as both a regulatory body as well as the 
supervisory body representing government investment. As the investor, SASAC 
guides and pushes the reform and restructuring of SOEs, supervises the preservation 
and increment of the value of state-owned assets for enterprises under its supervision, 
enhances the management of state-owned assets, advances the establishment of 
modern enterprises system in SOEs, and perfects corporate governance, and propels 
the strategic adjustment of the structure and layout of the state economy (SASAC 
website). As a regulatory body, SASAC is responsible to dispatch supervisory panels 
to some large enterprises on behalf of the state and take charge of daily management 
of the supervisory panels. It also appoints and removes top executives of enterprises, 
and evaluates their performances through legal procedures, either grants rewards or 
inflicts punishments based on their performances; establishes corporate executives 
selection system, and perfects incentives and restraints system for corporate 
management. SASAC is also responsible to draft laws, administrative regulations of 
the management of the state-owned assets and draws up related rules; direct and 
supervise the management work of local state-owned assets according to law. 
SASACs at various local levels have also been established.  
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The SASAC has been rising in authority, self-confidence and resources (Naughton, 
2005). However, there is also significant uncertainty and division of opinion caused 
by the SASAC’s ambiguous mandate. The SASAC combines both the ownership and 
regulatory functions. While it struggles to assume ownership authority, it 
simultaneously carries out regulatory and other miscellaneous roles which were 
previously under the government bureaucracy. This state of affairs gives the SASAC 
a powerful and intrusive role that sometimes is resented and often provokes criticism. 
These views are often encapsulated in the adage that the SASAC has become “both 
mother-in-law and boss” (Naughton, 2005). The SASAC itself is a “special non-
governmental organization under the State Council,” which always has its documents 
countersigned by the Ministry of Finance to ensure that they are legally binding. The 
SASAC’s legal position remains unclear because China has never been able to draft a 
law governing control of state-assets.   
 
3.2.3 Assessment of Corporate Governance  
Most state firms have re-organized under the company law over the years. They have 
diversified their ownership through sale of stock, although the state has remained the 
dominant shareholder in most cases. By the end of November 2003, 1,282 companies 
have listed on the Chinese stock exchanges, in either Shanghai or Shenzhen. A 
majority of these firms are large, state-controlled firms, converted from traditional 
SOEs. At the local level, hundreds of firms have been privatized; hundreds have been 
closed down or merged; and hundreds have been converted into corporations with 
diversified ownership. This vast process is still underway. However some problems 
have emerged. 
 
Firstly, as SOEs converted into corporations, they have gained more autonomy from 
their bureaucratic superiors. This has enabled the companies to orient themselves 
more towards the market; however it has also paved the way for principal-agent 
problem, as managers have obtained unprecedented degree of power. Furthermore, 
the process of privatization has been dominated by insiders in the enterprises and in 
their immediate superior agencies. The result has been the serious problems of asset-
stripping, and diversion of revenues. A major problem of corporate governance is that 
the current system does not provide adequate monitoring of incumbent managers. The   19
new “owners” of the SOEs, the central and local government SASAC have clearly 
targeted this problem. But it is not clear if they can effectively address it.  
 
Secondly, there is the procedure of how managers are selected. In theory, the top 
manager of a corporation is selected by the board of directors which in turn, is 
supposed to represent the interests of the shareholders. But in most corporatized 
Chinese state firms, the government or a single government-controlled agency is the 
majority shareholder. The SASAC was established to take over the role of the CPC in 
terms of personnel selection. Yet, Naughton (2005) argues that the SASAC still must 
work close with the CPC in personnel matters, hence the result of this process is 
something that falls short of the kind of supervision of managers by shareholders that 
one expects in a market economy. While the CPC and SASAC are far less ideological 
than such bodies would have been in the past, and far more oriented towards business 
strategy and profitability, they are inevitably swayed by other considerations as well. 
These organizations themselves simply do not have the same incentives as the owners 
of a firm do in a market economy, and so they are not the most effective agencies to 
monitor and oversee managerial performance.  
 
Finally, monitoring by banks over performance of state firms has been almost non-
existent. In other economies, such as Japan, Korea, and Germany, the banks play an 
important role in monitoring managers and overall firm performance. Banks in those 
economies often have representatives on corporate boards, and sometimes have 
ownership stakes or cross-shareholding relationships. Most importantly, when firm 
performance falters, banks in those economies move in to protect their interests, and 
begin to restrict the freedom of operation of managers. In China, however, the state-
owned banks are relatively weak. They do not have personnel or capabilities to 
exercise oversight over state industrial firms, nor do they have a strong legal position. 
Furthermore, in a bankruptcy case, banks have low precedence when residual claims 
are settled. As a result, banks are often forced to take large financial write-offs when 
firms are in trouble. China’s banks simply do not have the standing to exercise 
oversight and monitoring of state-run industrial corporations.    20
3.3   The ‘D’ of the triangle - Chinese Government Fiscal Deficit 
China had shifted from using monetary policy to fiscal policy in October 1997 as the 
major tool to stimulate future economic growth because monetary policy was not 
working effectively arising from the fragmented money and capital markets. The 
deflation that occurred in China after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 slowed 
domestic consumption, exports, and foreign direct investments (FDI). The Chinese 
central government was obliged to play the key role of stimulating domestic demand 
through fiscal policies in order to sustain economic growth. Since the beginning of 
1998, the Chinese government has drastically increased its expenditure and financed 
by issuing government debts and borrowing from bank. The use of fiscal policy to 
stimulate economic growth, however, has increased both the fiscal deficit and 
government debt in recent years. The deterioration of public finances in China has 
also been accompanied by the poor financial performance of the SOEs, whose profits 
in the early 1990s accounted for a significant proportion of total government revenue.   
 
In 2004, China, however, ran a budget deficit of just 1.5% of GDP, compared with a 
deficit of 3.0% in 2002. The deficit is expected to fall to just 0.8% of GDP in 2005. 
The improving fiscal situation has allowed the government more space to consider a 
number of taxation and revenue reforms. Among the reforms that are likely to top the 
government’s list of priorities are more spending on rural healthcare, and moves to 
scrap agricultural taxes. The improvement in the government’s fiscal position since 
2000 has been possible only as a result of tax reforms that were introduced in the mid-
1990s. These reforms, which led to an increase in the proportion of total revenue 
coming from indirect taxation rather than levies on income, contributed to an increase 
in government revenue to 19.3% of GDP in 2004, compared with only 10.9% in 1996 
(Business Monitor International, 2006). 
 
Overall, it would appear that China’s public finance is in good shape. However, these 
figures do not take into account the hidden liabilities of the deficit. These liabilities 
pertain to unfunded pensions and remaining NPLs. For the latter,  Agricultural Bank 
of China may require some RMB 800 billion to fully restore its balance sheets to 
health, while the tab for Guangdong Development Bank could run as high as RMB 50 
billion (Ma, 2006). Furthermore, the city commercial bank sector may need additional   21
injections of some RMB 150 billion to clean up the balance sheets or fund their exit, 
while the structuring bill for the three policy banks may reach RMB 250 billion. For 
the unfunded pension funds this is not something of immediate concern. Within 15 
years from 2006 the Chinese workforce will have peaked; and within 25 years the 
population in China will also have peaked. The current dependency ratio of three 
workers for one retiree today will be flipped in 25-30 years time (Anderson, 2005). 
Hence, the turnaround is predicted to be in 10-15 years, and it is not certain if the 
government will have the funds to bear the pension liability. On the other hand, no 
one really knows what the implicit pension liability is going to be. The Chinese 
government has not given any specific promises, other than it will contribute a fair 
share. However, if these liabilities are included, some estimates that the total debt to-
GDP ratio in China could be approaching 100% of GDP (Business Monitor 
International, 2006). 
 
4.  Beyond Dean’s “Asian Governance Triangle” 
During the pre-reform era the main source of enterprise financing was fiscal 
appropriations. The SOEs’ perennially employed fixed asset investment and working 
capital (‘budgeted working capital’) came from the state budget. Only temporary 
funds used for daily operations (‘non-budgeted working capital’) depended on short-
term loans from the PBoC. From 1949-78, the PBoC was the only state bank in China, 
integrating the functions of the central bank such as financial supervision with those 
of policy banks and commercial banks such as loans. However, after initiating 
economic reforms, the State Council stipulated in June 1983 that SOEs should 
gradually switch to bank loans to supplement their insufficient working capital. As a 
result, fiscal appropriations as a source of financing were gradually replaced by bank 
loans. Before 1979, two-thirds of the fixed asset investment of SOEs was financed by 
fiscal appropriations from the government. By the mid-1980s, however, the 
proportion had decreased to one-quarter (Wu, 2005). This established a stronger 
relationship between the banks and SOEs (see Figure 3.4), which laid the groundwork 
for the following deteriorating Chinese financial stability.   22
 
















GF: Government Finance 
S: State-owned Enterprises  
MB: Mono-bank system 
 
In terms of government finance spanning from the years 1952-83, the government 
was running both budget surpluses and deficits (see Figure 2). The years marked by 
government deficit seem to correspond with certain tumultuous periods of the PRC, 
such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), and the most chaotic years of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-68), which saw interruptions of economic activity. In addition, the 
year 1979 saw a huge budget deficit which was due to an expansion of enterprise 
autonomy, leading to increased salaries and bonuses, and accordingly more 
difficulties to balance state revenue and expenditure. This set the trend for the 
government budget deficits for the coming years as well.  
























































































: Denotes loose relationship   23
The first AGT implied total control and ownership by the state, with the notion that  
corporate governance was a non-issue. However, as China after 1978 opened the 
economy and ventured onto the path of economic reforms directed to transform the 
economy in to a market economy, this eventually has an effect on the dynamics of the 
AGT which can be observed in the second AGT model. 
 
4.1 The modified “Asian Governance Triangle” model  
After 1983 there was a shift to banking lending as a main source of funding for the 
SOEs. Additionally, the government deficit remained about 1% of GDP for the period 
19861996 (see Figure 4). After the Asian financial crisis, government deficits 
widened to 3% of GDP in 2002. 
 
Figure 4 – Government Deficit





































































* Based on official figures and not included hidden liabilities, such as unfunded pension and NPLs.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
Combined with the worsening fiscal situation, and the poor performance of both the 
banks and the SOEs, the stability of the triangle came under threat especially in the 
late 1990s. It seems that any financial worsening of the S and/or D entity was 
propagated to the banks, and thus the banks became the weakest link in the triangle. 
The increasing budget deficit meant that the banks had to step in and support the 
SOEs. This worsened the situation for the banks. However, the failure of the initial 
SOEs reforms to change the institutional framework of the SOEs, in which led to 
greater autonomy for the SOEs under the existing framework, was in fact counter-
productive in establishing good corporate governances. The result was overspending,   24
and consequently the banks became the victims of both the government deficit and 
inadequate SOE reforms. 
 
















D: Government Deficit, S: State-owned Enterprises, B: Banks 
SE: Stock Exchange, AMC: Asset Management Companies 
 
During the period 1984-2003, the government initiated further reforms to address the 
problems arising from the lack of corporate governance and pressing financial issues. 
This included the zhuada fangxiao policies, and also listing of certain SOEs on 
domestic stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen). The government retained a 
majority ownership, basically ensuring government control. This is the first step of 
bringing market economic practices in to the AGT. However, the dysfunctional 
domestic stock exchanges proved inefficient in improving corporate governance 
(Durnev et al, 2004). Only companies listed on overseas stock exchanges, such as 
PetroChina, saw improvements in corporate governance and transparency as they 
were subjected to the systems of well-functioning market economies.  
 
In addition, the AMCs were established by the Chinese authorities in 1999 in an 
attempt to resolve the alarming high levels of NPLs. AMCs are formally legally 
independent agencies with a very broad mandate, namely collecting NPLs, 
restructuring them or converting them in to equity. The AMCs became an important 
tool to stabilize the AGT, i.e. relieving the banks of the NPL burden. Furthermore, the 
creation of the AMCs indicated the government’s intention of using market practices 
in resolving the NPL problem, although under government control.  
D 
B  S  SE  AMC 
: denotes control    25
 
In the beginning of the 1990s the four specialized state banks (ABC, BoC, CCB, and 
ICBC) were transformed to wholly state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). 
According to the Commercial Bank Law of the PRC of 1995, the SOCBs should stop 
doing any non-bank business, such as “trust and investment”. Furthermore, these 
wholly state-owned commercial banks should adjust their disposition of branches and 
take back the power of their branches to grant loans without authorization from the 
headquarters. In addition, all commercial banks should introduce modern 
management methods including asset-liability ratio management, internal risk control, 
conservative accounting, and the five-tier loan classification. 
 
However, implementation of laws and regulations with the SOCBs has proven 
difficult. Some of the fundamental problems of the SOCBs are rooted in poorly 
defined relations of property rights and lack of proper governance structure. The 
SOCBs have been regarded as administrative organs by the government for a long 
time, which has complicated introduction of a system of board of directors and normal 
procedures for appointment and dismissal of presidents. In addition, even though the 
SOCBs are nominally state-owned banks, the owner is actually absent. Consequently, 
without pressure from the government, no one really cares about the financial and 
economic efficiency of state-owned banks.  
 
The AGT model (see Figure 5) has been modified to take into account the emergence 
of stock exchange and role of AMC in the governance structure. However, the period 
still saw the continuation of a system pervaded by “the absence of the owner” and 
“unchecked insider control” despite policies promulgated to curb such phenomena. 
These problems became prevalent in China’s state-owned enterprises, with the 
consequences that most gains went to private individuals while losses were borne by 
the state. However, there were positive developments as well. The “PetroChina” 
model showed that the government could achieve better corporate governance through 
market forces, whilst the government still retained control, although not 100% 
ownership. As for the banks the government still pursued 100% ownership and 
control, which proved rather fruitless.   26
4.2  The new “Asian Governance Triangle” – Beyond Dean’s model 
Since 2004, the fiscal situation in China has improved. The fiscal deficit of 2005 is 
estimated to be 0.8% of GDP and with favorable forecasts for the coming years. 
China's foreign exchange reserves also jumped 34% from 2004 to a new record of 
USD 818.9 billion in 2005. At the end of February 2006, China’s reserves reached 
USD 854 billion; surpassing Japan to become the world’s biggest holder of foreign 
exchange reserves (Business Week Online, 2006).  
 
China’s improved fiscal situation means that the government has been able to clean 
up the banks in terms of removing NPLs. Ma (2006) has estimated that China’s 
estimated bank restructuring bill to date has reached RMB 4 trillion. This is roughly 
around 22% of the 2005 GDP. This has significantly strengthened the banking system, 
as evidenced by a declining NPL ratio which stood at an average of 10.4% (official 
figures) for the SOCBs in 4Q2005 (see Table 6). Thus, the strengthening of the banks 
is beneficiary to the stability of the whole AGT. 
 
In a bid to improve corporate governance through supervision and regulation of the 
SOEs and the banks, the Chinese authorities in 2003 established the SASAC and 
CRBC respectively. SASAC’s role includes both ownership and regulatory functions. 
However, its legal position still is unclear given the vague laws in China pertaining to 
governing control of state-assets. The CBRC took over from the PBoC as the banking 
regulator, and has contributed to better corporate governance through more 
transparency (disclosing NPLs ratio), sound banking policies (implementation of five-
tier loan classification, capital adequacy policies) etc. These two entities constitute 
important elements of the government’s strategy to reduce government interference, 
while at the same ensure control.  
The economic reforms are of little use if it does not change the fundamental structures 
of the SOEs and the banks. The SOE reforms of the 1980s did little to improve the 
situation of SOEs in terms of removing government influence, and there were mixed 
results with the substantial restructuring of the SOEs in the 1990s. Some of the 
problems were solved, such as PetroChina, however the “remaining enterprise” was 
still there with unresolved problems. As for the banks, the Commercial Bank Law of 
1995 stipulated that the SOCBs were to become modern, transparent enterprises,   27
however this did not materialize. The answer lies in corporate governance. NPLs 
clean ups and restructuring of the assets are all important, however if the operating 
system is not changed, the changes are of little permanent effect. The NPL ratio 
would just be increasing again if the same structure persisted.  
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Corporate governance could not be improved with too heavy government intervention, 
nor too little intervention, as this would lead to unchecked insider control. The 
solution rests in letting the market to do its job. However, if the establishment of good 
corporate governance for the SOEs and banks translates into reduction of ownership 
and perceived loss of control for the government, then it is understandable from the 
government’s point of view that this is undesirable. Yet, what is important to grasp, 
and what the Chinese government has done, is that reduction of ownership (e.g. from 
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: denotes control  
: denotes minority ownership   28
100% to 70%) does not necessarily mean loss of control. The government will still 
have the majority of the shares and thus control, while a minority of the shares will be 
controlled by outsiders. Hence, the reduction of ownership is outweighed by 
improved corporate governance. However, the process of establishing corporate 
governance takes some time.    
 
Research conducted on the SOCBs’ behavior from 1997-2004 (Podpiera, 2006) 
suggests that their behavior has not substantially changed and become commercially 
oriented. The banks have slowed down credit expansion, but the pricing of credit risk 
remains undifferentiated. Furthermore, the SOCBs’ lending appears to be driven 
mainly by the availability of funds (savings deposits) and does not take enterprise 
performance into account.  
 
Financial crises have often taken place when internal fragility (weak banks) has led to 
a crisis on a country’s external capital accounts. There is a belief in the market that 
the Chinese RMB in undervalued. It is difficult to say exactly by how much, however 
just the belief of undervaluation implies that there will be capital inflow and upward 
pressure on the RMB. According to Anderson (2005), the biggest problems seen in 
emerging markets today, and most emerging market crises seen in the last 15 years, 
have all been tied to fixed exchange rates. Countries have been holding desperately to 
a fixed-currency regime too long in the face of policies that have been going in 
different directions that have made that currency unsustainable. China is not there yet, 
but there is a very good chance that in a few years down the road China could be in a 
position that perhaps Argentina or the Asian crisis economies were in.  
 
As of today, China’s capital controls are shielding the AGT. A weakening of the 
capital controls until the banks have been cleaned up and adopted good corporate 
governance practices will indeed be a risky move. The Chinese authorities are aware 
of this, and as long the capital controls are in place it is unlikely there will be a run on 
the banks. If depositors flee the Chinese banks (or banking system) this would 
certainly constitute a great danger for the stability of the Chinese banking system and 
for the whole financial system. That makes the banking system possibly the weakest 
link in the financial system.    29
5. Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the “Asian Governance Triangle” proposed by Dean (2001), 
and investigated the historical and quantitative nature of the symbiotic relationships 
between the three entities of the triangle, namely the government budget deficit, 
industry (SOEs) and finance (banks). Furthermore, the SOE and banking reforms 
have been assessed in order to trace the developments in these two important entities 
of the AGT, as well as an overview of China’s fiscal situation. These assessments laid 
the basis for an evolutionary analysis of the AGT starting from the foundation of the 
PRC in 1949 and till present day. Moreover, this analysis identified three models of 
the AGT corresponding to three periods; 1949-1983, 1984-2002, and 2003-2006. 
 
The analysis has revealed that the ‘loan for grant’ policy in 1983, leading to the 
SOEs’ subsequent heavy reliance on bank loans for funding, was an important factor 
to form a coherent ‘triangle’ which eventually led to instabilities of the whole of 
China’s financial system. Furthermore, failed SOE reforms to improve performance 
and efficiency, combined with a worsened fiscal deficit, moved China close to a 
financial disaster in the 1990s. The seriousness of the situation is highlighted through 
the AGT model which suggests that if one of the entities fails (government, SOE or 
banks) the financial system collapses. 
 
The potential fatal characteristic of the AGT has been the notion that ‘everything is 
government-owned’, hence over-spending has been the norm among SOEs and 
consequently a very unhealthy NPL ratio has developed. In addition, the phenomena 
of “absence of the owner” and “unchecked insider control” have traditionally been 
prevalent in China’s state-owned industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises. 
The new AGT model proposed in this paper has illustrated that the government is 
trying to separate itself from the SOEs and the SOCBs through the establishment of 
SASAC and CBRC respectively. This further highlights that control is a more 
important factor than ownership, and that good corporate governance is a prerequisite 
for to the stability of the AGT. Ultimately, the success of the banking reforms and 
SOE reforms rests on the government’s ability to create strong incentives for SOEs 
and banks to base their operations on commercial principles.  
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China’s resolve in dealing with the weaknesses of the AGT has so far shown results. 
The large centrally controlled SOEs have shown good profits and the banking system 
has been strengthened. The foreign exchange reserves also provide added security. 
However, it is still too early to judge the effectiveness of SASAC and CBRC in terms 
of improving corporate governance of the AGT. As of now, the AGT is shielded by 
capital controls. A banking crisis, with a spill-over to the whole AGT, seems like an 
unlikely scenario for now due to the capital control policy. This policy is a second-
best policy given the problems of the SOEs and the SOCBs. It reduces efficiency and 
welfare by restricting domestic enterprises and households directly accessing to the 
international capital market. But it also prevents external speculative attacks that have 
triggered financial crises in some countries. 
 
Over the years, a series of reforms of its SOEs and banking system has severed the 
symbiosis relationships through the introduction of banking and corporate governance 
in the system. Any disruption of the gradual approach towards the reforms by hastily 
adopting a flexible exchange rate and free capital flows would do more harm than 
benefit China in the long run. 
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